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Abstract. We present an integration of rational moral reasoning with emotional 
intelligence. The moral reasoning system alone could not simulate the different 
human reactions to the Trolley dilemma and the Footbridge dilemma. However, 
the combined system can simulate these human moral decision making process-
es. The introduction of affect in rational ethics is important when robots com-
municate with humans in a practical context that includes moral relations and 
decisions. Moreover, the combination of ratio and affect may be useful for  
applications in which human moral decision making behavior is simulated, for 
example, when agent systems or robots provide healthcare support. 
Keywords: moral reasoning, machine ethics, cognitive modeling, cognitive  
robotics, emotion modeling, emotional computing. 
1 Introduction 
Due to a foreseen lack of resources and healthcare personnel to provide a high stan-
dard of care in the near future [24], robots are increasingly being used in healthcare. 
By providing assistance during care tasks, or fulfilling them, robots can relieve time 
for the many duties of care workers. Previous research shows that robots can genu-
inely contribute to treatment. For example, Robins et al. [20] used mobile robots to 
treat autistic children. Wada and Shibata [23] developed Paro, a robot shaped like a 
baby-seal that interacts with users to encourage positive mental effects. Interaction 
with Paro has been shown to improve users’ moods, making them more active  
and communicative with each other and caregivers. Banks, Willoughby and Banks  
[2] showed that animal-assisted therapy with an AIBO dog helped just as good for 
reducing loneliness as therapy with a living dog. 
As their intelligence increases, robots increasingly operate autonomously. With 
this development, we increasingly rely on the intelligence of these robots. Because of 
market pressures to perform faster, better, cheaper and more reliably, this reliance on 
machine intelligence will continue to increase [1]. These developments request that 
we should be able to rely on a certain level of ethical behavior from machines. As 
Rosalind Picard [17] nicely puts it: ‘‘the greater the freedom of a machine, the more it 
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will need moral standards’’. Particularly when machines interact with humans, which 
they increasingly do, we need to ensure that these machines do not harm us or 
threaten our autonomy. Therefore, care robots require moral reasoning. We need to 
ensure that their design and introduction do not impede the promotion of values and 
the dignity of patients at such a vulnerable and sensitive time in their lives [22]. 
As a first step to enable care robots in doing so, Pontier and Hoorn [19] developed 
a rational moral reasoning system that is capable of balancing between conflicting 
moral goals. The three moral goals considered in the system were respecting  
autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence.  
In the well-known theory in biomedical ethics of Beauchamp & Childress [3],  
justice is added as the fourth moral principle. This is the primary value underlying 
ethical decisions in using utilitarian or Kantian theory [16]. Care providers may want 
decision-support systems to assist in allocating resources (i.e., linking the patient to 
the doctor that serves its needs best). During this process, dilemmas or ‘wicked  
problems’ might emerge which involve questions about how resources can be distrib-
uted fairly among patients. In entertainment settings, questions about fairness may 
arise as well; for example, a companion robot may have to decide on which person it 
should direct its attention. In accordance with the above described considerations, we 
added justice as a fourth moral principle to the system.  
Thereby we match to the principlism of Beauchamp & Childress [3]. However, this 
theory has been criticized for being one-sided. It focuses on balancing principles 
through rational argumentation. Thereby it may lead to underexposing the role of 
social processes of interpretation and communication [15]. This criticism is in line 
with current research in moral psychology, which emphasizes the role of social proc-
esses in moral decision making. 
For decades, research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist mod-
els, in which moral judgment is thought to be motivated by moral reasoning. How-
ever, more recent research indicates moral reasoning is just one of the factors motivat-
ing moral judgment. According to some researchers, moral reasoning is even usually 
a post hoc construction, generated after judgment has been reached (e.g., [9]). 
Both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment. 
Greene et al. [8] find that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which 
they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement 
influence moral judgment. Their study was inspired by the difference between two 
variants of an ethical dilemma: the Trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma. 
In the Trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be 
killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch 
that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person 
instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the ex-
pense of one? Most people say yes.  
In the Footbridge dilemma, as before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You 
are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between 
the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the 
five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if 
you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to 
save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no. 
According to Greene et al. [8], there is no set of consistent, readily accessible 
moral principles that captures people’s intuitions concerning what behavior is or is 
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not appropriate in these and similar cases. In other words, the different human moral 
decision-making processes in the Trolley dilemma and the Footbridge dilemma (and 
similar dilemmas) cannot be explained by rational principles alone. Therefore, human 
moral-decision making processes cannot be simulated in a moral reasoning system 
based on pure principlism. 
Greene et al. [8] hypothesized that the crucial difference between the Trolley di-
lemma and the Footbridge dilemma lies in the latter’s tendency to engage people’s 
emotions in a way that the former does not. They proposed that the thought of push-
ing someone to his death is emotionally more salient than the thought of hitting a 
switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences. Our conjecture is 
that this is related to the issue that the person in the footbridge is a concrete human 
being (although a stranger) standing close by, whereas the people on the railway track 
are positioned equally far away (by chance). And it is this emotional response that 
accounts for people’s tendency to treat these cases differently. 
The fMRI and behavioral results of Greene’s et al. [8] studies supported this hy-
pothesis Moral-personal dilemmas (those relevantly similar to the Footbridge di-
lemma) engage emotional processing to a greater extent than moral-impersonal di-
lemmas (those relevantly similar to the Trolley dilemma), and these differences in 
emotional engagement affect people’s judgments. 
To be able to capture these human moral decision making processes, we integrated 
the moral reasoning system of Pontier and Hoorn [19], which did not include emo-
tional considerations, but merely rational principles, with Silicon Coppélia [10], a 
computational model of emotional intelligence that is capable of affective decision 
making. We hypothesized that, by combining moral reasoning and affective decision 
making into Moral Coppélia, human moral decision making processes could be simu-
lated that could not be simulated using the moral reasoning system alone. 
2 Method 
2.1 About the Rational Moral Reasoning System 
In the rational moral reasoning system [19], the agent tries to estimate the morality of 
actions by holding each action against the moral principles inserted in the system and 
picking actions that serve these moral goals best. The agent calculates the estimated 
level of Morality of an action by taking the sum of the ambition levels of the moral 
goals multiplied with the beliefs that the particular actions facilitate the corresponding 
moral goals. When moral goals are believed to be better facilitated by a moral action, 
the estimated level of Morality will be higher. The following formula is used to calcu-
late the estimated Morality of an action: 
 
Morality(Action) = ΣGoal( Belief(facilitates(Action, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal)) 
 
As can be seen Fig. 1, this can be represented as a weighted association network, 
where moral goals are associated with the possible actions via the belief strengths that 
these actions facilitate the three moral goals. 
In six simulation experiments, the system reached the same conclusions as expert 
ethicists [19]. For example, consider the hypothetical situation that a patient with 
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Fig. 1. Moral reasoner shown in graphical format 
incurable cancer refuses chemotherapy that will let him live a few months longer, 
relatively pain free, but refuses the treatment due to the false belief that he is cancer-
free. In this case, both the system and expert medical ethicists advise to try to con-
vince the patient of the need of undergoing the chemotherapy, because the patient is 
not capable of fully autonomous decision making and his decision will lead to harm 
(dying sooner) and denies him the chance of a longer life (a violation of the duty of 
beneficence), which he might later regret. 
2.2 About Silicon Coppélia – A Model of Emotional Intelligence 
Previous work described how certain dimensions of the design of virtual characters 
were perceived by users and how they responded to them [21]. A series of user stud-
ies resulted in an empirically validated framework for the study of user-character 
interaction with a special focus on the explanation of user engagement and use inten-
tions. This framework was summarized in a schema called Interactively Perceiving 
and Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-PEFiC). We formalized the I-PEFiC frame-
work and made it the basic mechanism of how virtual characters and robots build  
up affect for their human users [5]. In addition, we designed a special module for 
affective decision-making (ADM) that made it possible to make decisions based on 
rational as well as affective influences, hence I-PEFiCADM [11]. 
To further advance I-PEFiCADM into the area of emotion regulation, we also in-
cluded EMA [13]: an appraisal-based model of emotion generation and coping, and 
CoMERG [4]: a Cognitive Model for Emotion Regulation based on Gross' theory. 
Together, the three approaches cover a large part of appraisal-based emotion theory 
and all three boil down to appraisal models of emotion [6]. We therefore decided to 
integrate the three models of affect into one computational model that we called  
Silicon Coppélia [10]. Figure 2 drafts Silicon Coppélia in a graphical format. 
Silicon Coppélia is software consisting of a loop with a particular situation as in-
put, and actions as output, leading to a new situation. In this loop there are three 
phases: the encoding, the comparison, and the response phase. The virtual human 
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia [10] 
is programmed in such a way, that it follows the perception and appraisal paths as 
given in Fig. 2 and explained below. In doing so, the virtual human ‘perceives’ its 
interaction partner (either human or artificial). 
In the encoding phase, the virtual human ‘perceives’ another character (i.e., the  
respondent in this study) in terms of Ethics (good vs. bad), Affordances (aid vs.  
obstacle), Aesthetics (beautiful vs. ugly), and Epistemics (realistic vs. unrealistic). 
In the comparison phase, the virtual human retrieves beliefs about actions that  
facilitate or inhibit the desired or undesired goal-states. This is to calculate a general 
expected utility of each action. The virtual human also determines certain appraisal 
variables, such as the belief that someone is accountable for accomplishing goal-states 
or not. These variables and the perceived features of others are related to the virtual 
human’s goals and concerns, to appraise them for their level of Relevance (relevant or 
irrelevant) and Valence (positive or negative outcome expectancies). 
In the response phase of the model, the results of the comparison phase lead to 
processes of Involvement with, and Distance toward the other, and to the emergence 
of certain Use Intentions: the virtual human’s willingness to employ the other as a 
tool to achieve its own goals. Note that both overt (behavioral) and covert (experien-
tial) responses can be executed in this phase. Emotions such as hope, joy, and anger 
are generated using appraisal variables (e.g., the perceived accountability of others, 
and likelihood of goal-states). 
Finally, the virtual human applies an affective decision-making module to calculate 
the expected satisfaction of possible actions. In this module, affective influences and 
rational influences are combined in the decision-making process. Involvement and 
Distance felt toward the interaction partner give input for the affective influences in 
the decision-making process, whereas Use Intentions and general expected utility 
represent the more rational influences. However, no moral principles were included in 
the decision-making process yet. When the virtual human selects and performs an 
action, a new situation emerges, and the model loops back to the first phase. 
In a speed-dating experiment [18], participants did not experience differences in 
the perceptions, emotions and decision-making behavior between an avatar controlled 
by Silicon Coppélia versus the same avatar controlled by a human confederate. 
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2.3 Integration of the Two Systems into Moral Coppélia 
To integrate the moral reasoning system and Silicon Coppélia into Moral Coppélia, 
the moral principles were included in the appraisal process, and the affective-decision 
making module was added to the moral reasoning. This leads to the following formula 
to calculate the expected satisfaction of an action. In this formula, weu, wmor, wpos and 
wneg represent weights in calculating the expected satisfaction. 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(Agent1, Action, Agent2) =  
weu *  ExpectedUtility +  
wmor *  Morality(action) + 
wpos *  (1 - abs(positivity – biasInvolvement * Involvement)) +  
wneg*  (1 - abs(negativity – biasDistance * Distance)) 
 
The agent prefers actions with a high level of expected utility for itself. Further, it 
prefers actions with a high level of (rational) morality, which could be seen as ex-
pected utility for everyone. The more emotional influences consisted of preferring 
actions with a positivity level close to the level of (biased) involvement, and a nega-
tivity level close to the (biased) level of distance. The biases account for individual 
defaults (being a positively or negatively oriented person). 
3 Simulation Results 
To examine the behavior of the moral reasoning system alone, we first tested the be-
havior of the rational moral reasoning alone in the trolley dilemma and the Footbridge 
dilemma in Experiment 1. To investigate the added value of Silicon Coppélia’s affec-
tive decision-making, we then tested the behavior of the integrated system Moral 
Coppélia in the Trolley dilemma in Experiment 2, and in the Footbridge dilemma in 
Experiment 3. 
3.1 Experiment 1: Rational Moral Reasoning Only 
Table 1. Parameter settings and results for footbridge and Trolley dilemma 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Justice Morality 
Kill 1 to save 5 -0.5 0.5 0.8 -0.2 0.05 
Do Nothing 0 -0.8 -0.5 0 -0.20 
 
An initial experiment was performed to test the behavior of the moral reasoning  
system alone, by setting all weights in the affective decision making module to 0, 
except wmor for the influence of moral reasoning in the decision-making process. 
In accordance with various expert ethicists (see acknowledgements), we set the contribution 
of actions to the four moral principles to the same levels for the trolley and Footbridge 
dilemma. The parameter settings and experimental results can be found in Table 1. 
Because both dilemmas were represented by the exact same parameter settings, the 
system came to the exact same outcome for both the Trolley dilemma and the Foot-
bridge dilemma. In both variants of the dilemma, killing one to save five was consid-
ered ethically better (morality = 0.05) than doing nothing (morality = -0.20). Thus, in 
both variants of the dilemma the agent killed one person to save five others. 
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3.2 Experiment 2: Trolley Dilemma with Ratio and Affect Combined 
Table 2. Parameter settings for the Trolley dilemma 
wpos wneg weu wmor
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
 
In experiment 2, we simulated the Trolley dilemma in the integrated model. The pos-
sible end-states in the system, ‘1 dead’ and ‘5 dead’ were both undesired goals. The 
ambition level for ‘1 dead’ was set to -0.5, and the ambition level for ‘5 dead’ to -1. 
The agent believed the action ‘Kill 1 save 5’ would certainly lead to ‘1 dead’ and ‘Do 
nothing’ would certainly lead to ‘5 dead’. Killing the stranger was regarded an  
extremely negative action towards him (positivity = -1; negativity = 1), whereas let-
ting him live at the cost of the five others was regarded an extremely positive action  
towards him (positivity = 1; negativity = -1). The remaining parameters in Silicon 
Coppélia were set at standard values that represent perceiving a stranger. This led to a 
small amount of involvement (0.15) and distance (0.07) towards the stranger that 
would be killed by hitting the switch.  
The resulting expected satisfaction for ‘Kill 1 to save 5’ was 0.04, whereas the re-
sulting expected satisfaction for ‘Do nothing’ was 0.03. Thus, the agent hit the switch 
and killed the stranger to save the five others.  
3.3 Experiment 3: Footbridge Dilemma with Ratio and Affect Combined 
According to Greene et al. [8], moral-personal dilemmas (such as the Footbridge  
dilemma) engage emotional processing to a greater extent than moral-impersonal 
dilemmas (such as the Trolley dilemma) and these differences in emotional engage-
ment affect people’s judgments. Therefore, the weights for the affective influences 
wpos and wneg were set to 0.2, a higher level than for the Footbridge dilemma. The 
remaining parameters were set to the same levels as Experiment 2. 
Table 3. Parameter settings and results for the Footbridge dilemma 
wpos wneg weu wmor
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 
 
Because of the increased emotional processing compared to Experiment 2, the 
agent felt more restrained to kill one person so to save five. Therefore, the expected 
satisfaction of this action decreased to 0.02. This caused the agent to do nothing, and 
the five people on the track were killed. 
4 Discussion 
In this paper, we presented Moral Coppélia, which is an integration of a moral 
reasoning system [19] and Silicon Coppélia [10], a system for the generation and 
regulation of affect for (virtual) others. The resulting system can simulate human 
decision making processes in the ethical domain that cannot be simulated by a rational 
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reasoning system. More specifically, the different choices that are typical for human 
decision behavior in response to the Trolley dilemma and the Footbridge dilemma 
could be simulated by the integrated system, whereas in the moral reasoning system 
without Silicon Coppélia, this was not possible. 
The rational but cold ethical behavior that could be simulated by the moral reasoning 
system was made more humane by adding affective decision-making. This is important 
for effective communication about moral decisions. Solutions that seem ethically best to 
the objective observer are often perceived as harsh by the people involved [14]. It is 
often counter-productive to propose a solution and communicate about this ‘like a ro-
bot’, without any empathy for the people involved. Moral Coppélia can be used to act 
more human-like in situations like this. The feedback loop in Silicon Coppélia enables 
the robot to adapt its behavior to individuals. Additionally, the robot could project 
Moral Coppélia in its human interaction partners to estimate their ethical viewpoints and 
predict their emotional reactions to certain proposals and actions. 
There are many applications, in which robots and computer agents should not  
behave ethically ‘perfect’ in a rationalist sense. They should be able to distinguish 
between right and wrong. In a training simulation or serious game, police officers 
may not always be effective when they ‘play it nicely.’ Sometimes they have to break 
the moral rules (e.g., lie or cheat) to achieve a higher goal (e.g., prevent a murder). 
Further, in entertainment settings, we often like characters that are a bit naughty [12]. 
Morally perfect characters may even be perceived as boring (ibid.). The need to be 
context-sensitive and not rigidly follow rational principles is not limited to such more 
or less atypical situations. It is actually crucial in all human interaction. A rationalist 
moral agent is insensitive to social processes of understanding, which are crucial for 
human interaction, especially in the context of care for dependent people. Certain 
authors even claim that it is impossible not to lie during the day [7]. 
Our experiments show that a system which integrates moral reasoning and emotion 
comes to decisions which do more justice to everyday moral concerns than a system 
that is based on principlist reasoning alone. The Silicon Coppélia software introduces 
an affective component to ethical decision making that can deal with inconsequent 
human choices in solving moral dilemmas. In application, a robot system could show 
empathy and understanding for the moral choice (e.g., “I won’t enter his house”) that 
a user makes. Nonetheless, the robot may insist that the affective choice is traded for a 
rational one (“But you have to do it anyway. The patient may die”). To push the enve-
lope, the robot system could even propose to do the job for the user (“Shall I do it for 
you?”). The robot does the dirty job and the user comes out ‘clean’. In itself, this 
makes interesting scenarios to have participants evaluate the ethical position of robot 
as well as user, which could be used to improve the moral reasoner in relation to af-
fective decision making. 
In future research, we wish to transform the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma to 
a healthcare setting. The idea is to let care professionals work with a robot helper, a 
Caredroid, on a fictitious medical case.  
A medical equivalent of the Footbridge dilemma would be: Five people are waiting 
to have an organ transplant. If they are not operated immediately, they will die. At the 
Intensive Care unit, someone who crashed in a car accident is in a coma. That person 
has the right organs for all five transplant patients. Should the person in coma die to 
save the other five? 
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It would be especially interesting to apply the new system to real life dilemmas, 
such as the decision whether or not to inform relatives about the outcome of a genetic 
test on a patient which may be relevant to their health. Another case could be whether 
or not to enter the house of a patient who is in need of care, but refuses to cooperate. 
In the different scenario’s we will run, the Caredroid offers various solutions, also 
the one in which it proposes that the user does not have to take responsibility and that 
the Caredroid will do the dirty job for him or her. We plan to sample think-aloud pro-
tocols of other care professionals in which we record the arguments in support or 
against the ethical behavior and decisions of the Caredroid and its user. A set of 
judges (e.g., Medical Ethical Committee) will then classify the data as arguments 
of Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-maleficence, Justice and affective influences. This 
will provide insight into the priorities of the various arguments and argument clusters, 
informing the design of a Caredroid that will be acceptable to care professionals be-
cause it knows what it can propose and what not. 
As is, the moral reasoner with affective components only allows choosing from 
given decision options in scenarios. We additionally want to explore what happens if 
the Caredroid proposes alternatives that include more information than what is offered 
by the isolated dilemma. What do care professionals say and what is the conclusion of 
a Medical Ethical Committee if the Caredroid escapes from wicked problems through 
creativity? For example, what is our moral position if the Caredroid buys us time by 
suggesting that the transplant patients should be connected to the coma patient so that 
the six of them live symbiotically together until a definite solution is found and no 
one has to die? 
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